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New Books
Cognitive adaptation : a pragmatist perspective - Jay Schulkin.
Call Number: BF311 .S386 2009
ISBN/ISSN: 0521517915
Cambridge University Press
"Cognitive Adaptation: A Pragmatist Perspective argues that there is a fundamental link between cognitive/neural systems and evolution that underlies human activity. One important result is that the line between nature and culture and scientific and humanistic inquiry is quite permeable - the two are fairly continuous with each other. Two concepts figure importantly in our human ascent: agency and animacy. The first is the recognition of another person as having beliefs, desires, and a sense of experience."
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind - Robert D. Rupert
Call Number: BF311 .R864 2009
ISBN/ISSN: 0195379454
Oxford University Press
"Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science, that is, the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint product of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses primarily on the hypothesis of extended cognition, which asserts that human cognitive processes literally comprise elements beyond the boundary of the human organism. Rupert argues that the only plausible way in which to demarcate cognitions is systems-based: cognitive states or processes are the states of the integrated set of mechanisms and capacities that contribute casually and distinctively to the production of cognitive phenomena--for example, language-use, memory, decision-making, theory construction, and, more importantly, the associated forms of behavior. Rupert argues that this integrated systems is most likely to appear within the boundaries of the human organism. He argues that the systems-based view explains the existing successes of cognitive psychology and cognate fields in a way that extended conceptions of cognition do not, and that once the systems-based view has been adopted, it is especially clear how extant arguments in support of the extended view go wrong. Cognitive Systems also examines further aspects of the situated program in cognitive science, including the embedded and embodied approaches to cognition. Rupert asks to what extent the plausible incarnations of these situated views depart from orthodox, computational cognitive science. Here, Rupert focuses on the notions of representation and computation, arguing that the embedded and embodied views do not constitute the radical shifts in perspective they are often claimed to be. Rupert also argues that, properly understood, the embodied view does not offer a new role for the body, different in principle from the one presupposed by orthodox cognitive science."
Cognition and perception : how do psychology and neural science inform philosophy? - Athannassios Raftopoulos
Call Number: BF311 .R25 2009
ISBN/ISSN: 0262013215
MIT Press
"In Cognition and Perception,Athanassios Raftopoulos discusses the cognitive penetrability of perception and claims that there is a part of visual processes (which he calls "perception") that results in representational states with nonconceptual content; that is, a part that retrieves information from visual scenes in conceptually unmediated, "bottom-up," theory-neutral ways. Raftopoulos applies this insight to problems in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, and examines how we access the external world through our perception as well as what we can know of that world. To show that there is a theory-neutral part of existence, Raftopoulos turns to cognitive science and argues that there is substantial scientific evidence. He then claims that perception induces representational states with nonconceptual content and examines the nature of the nonconceptual content. The nonconceptual information retrieved, he argues, does not allow the identification or recognition of an object but only its individuation as a discrete persistent object with certain spatiotemporal properties and other features. Object individuation, however, suffices to determine the referents of perceptual demonstratives. Raftopoulos defends his account in the context of current discussions on the issue of the theory-ladenness of perception (namely the Fodor-Churchland debate), and then discusses the repercussions of his thesis for problems in the philosophy of science. Finally, Raftopoulos claims that there is a minimal form of realism that is defensible. This minimal realism holds that objects, their spatiotemporal properties, and such features as shape, orientation, and motion are real, mind-independent properties in the world. A Bradford Book"
Subject Librarian |
Colin McCaffreyOnline Chat / Networks:
Contact Info:
Olin Library 122
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(314) 935-5492
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Subjects:
Philosophy, Classics, Linguistics, PNP
 |
Contact Info:
Olin Library 122
Reference Department
(314) 935-5492
Send Email
Subjects:
Philosophy, Classics, Linguistics, PNP
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